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Measurements of dietary uptake have been widely used in sciences that are not
primarily concerned with the determinants of dietary behavior. Measurements of
food intake by themselves, however, do not advance our understanding of ap-
petite (Booth, 1987b). Yet such behaviorally uninterpretable data dominate the
research literature on "feeding."
A scientific symposium on appetite should therefore be selective. The research
presented at this conference uses many tools from modem biology and chemistry.
Yet the experiments also address issues about the psychological and physiological
processes involved in eating behavior, or at least they yield phenomena that are
susceptible to an analysis of the mechanisms of appetite.
The diversion of research away from the behavioral causation within appetite
reflects in part a sociological phenomenon in the sciences generally, especially in
the United States. Behavioral and social scientists have been neglecting, or even
deserting, their home disciplines for biological areas such as neuroscience, phar-
macology, metabolism, or genetics. Discoveries about a behavioral phenomenon
or a social problem seldom get much of a scientific audience unless they invoke a
pia\'(' illllll' braill, alll'lIrolr:IIISllliltcr I'lTl'plor, a Sl'qlll'IICl'd!',l'lIl', or SOllll'lliilll'.01
lliat ilk,
SlIdl biological or I:VI:11clil:mical rl:dllctionislll is strangdy blilld 10 a !',I:IIill)'.
dl'iil'il'lIcy in ils own logic. This r1aw is I:xposl:d by thl: paradox tliat hiolo)',isl.·,
n'sisl l'l'duclionist claims rrom physil:s, It seems so I:kar to thl:m Ihat organisllls
I\lId IlloleclIks rl:ally exist and work al:wrding to thl:ir own rllll:s, without cast in!',
111qlll'sliontlw rundamental physical forces and struelurl:s (whatl:vl:r thl:y lurll 0111
10 11l'),Yd, ir lire exists, then assuredly mental processes exist also, Ikyond llil'
Illillds or individual organisms, furthermore, social organizations havl: a lire or
Ihl'ir own, while being no less comprised of debris from the Big Bang.
Thus, neither the brain nor any other part of human biology will be understood
IIl1less research also takes on board the realities of both the mental processes
llI'galli:t.ingthe observed neural and bodily functioning and the cultural processl:s
10 whkh human brains and bodies become socialized as the individual person
dl'vdops (Booth, 1987a, 1988; Hatfield, 1988),
Thr sdentific understanding of appetite cannot advance without sociological,
psyrhologkal, and physiological analyses of the processes organizing ingestive
Iwhuviol'.
I kspile this fact, little research on "feeding" and its neuroscience-or, for
Iliul Illalter, applied human nutrition or food marketing-measures the moment-
to 1I10nwntsomatic, sensory, and social influences on the behaviors that together
lJ,l'nl~ralethe observed intakes. Instead, the disappearance of food from stock is
IlIl'asured more and more reliably over periods of an hour or even a day. Intake is
sllb,iected to finer and finer temporal analysis. This does not assess or control the
illpllls that are the determinants of such output. Therefore, it must miss the
sdentiric issues about appetite.
1. Dietary Selection
NUlritional science cannot advance without including behavioral data. To analyze
behavior, we must measure and manipulate a great deal more than the nutrient
rontents of the diet and its effects on tissues.
Nutrient preparations affect ingestive behavior directly through their sensory
attributes, their effects in the gut, and effects in the tissues that are reached during
['ating. It is therefore quite unscientific to give the name "nutrient selection" to
Ihe relative intakes of diets differing in nutrient composition. It is misleading even
10 report the observed intakes in terms of the generic nutrients (i.e., carbohydrate,
protein, fat), rather than as the specific preparations used (e.g., dextrin, casein,
corn oil, with details of supplier and batch). This is because the key issues always
cenler round the sensory characteristics of the diets. Neither the choice between
dicls nor their relative intakes needs to be caused by the nutrients as such. The
illlmediately controlling factors are liable to be flavors or textures that have no
rl'iiabk' conlll'clioll with till' IlIltritioll:d l,rkcts or the nutrient preparations used,
whether in the species' history or in the ealer's own past experience.
It is now becoming more widdy appreciated that adaptation to a diet often
teadles the organism what sensory characteristics are associated with what nutri-
tional erfeels. Verbal acknowledgment of the role ofleaming does not, however,
do anything to avoid the fallacy of confusing intakes of particular preparations
with nutrient selection. The effect of a drug or a dietary preload on dietary
selection does not have to be on the acquired sensory mediation of nutritional
control. It can arise from any number of other influences on intake.
Thus, we shall build a sound neuroscience of human nutrition only if we take
full empirical account of the cognitive and behavioral processes involved in food
choices, and indeed of the sociology of eating (Booth, 1987a).
2. Satiety Values
Equally unproductive and even misleading is a so-called psychobiology of food
intake that ignores both the biological processes and the psychological processes
by which foods control eating. This is illustrated by current interest in the' 'satiety
values" of foods and food constituents. It is not bits of the diet that have
quantitative effects on intake. The suppressant or indeed excitant effect of eating a
food on subsequent intake is an interaction between the mechanisms that influence
the eater's appetite and that person's subsequent occasions for eating (Booth,
1989a).
Sweetness, for example, is liable to provoke both visceral and also cognitive
processes that modify the control of ingestion. Without any attempt to measure
such processes, experiments on the effects of sweeteners on food intake, or on
ratings predictive of intake, cannot yield interpretable results (Booth, 1987c) or
even be designed effectively (Booth, 1989a). Furthermore, different sweeteners
cannot be shown to differ in their effects until significantly different results are
demonstrated within the same experiment, accompanied by data showing that the
sweetness levels were not discriminable.
3. Data for Other Sciences
Mere intake data can of course be useful to enterprises-from biochemical
nutrition to experimental neuropsychology-in which analysis of ingestive be-
havior is beside the point. Pharmacologists and geneticists, for example, can
advance their own sciences by varying the diet in any consistent fashion and
recording the effects of drugs or animal strains on intake. But differences between
drugs or genes in their effects in a food intake test can tell us only about the drug
receptors or the genetic differences. Such work does nothing to advance the
understanding of behavior, even if it professes to be psychopharmacology or
psychogenetics. Drugs or genes can be useful tools in the study of ingestive
behavior only if the ongoing causal influences on the observed intakes are mea-
sured at the same time (Booth, 1989b).
Much pharmacological and nutritional research on dietary intakes thus has no
clear prospect of connecting with hehavior:d and phV,~iolo",iL'alknowkd)',l', IIV
careful comparisons among the chapters in Ihis book. IhL' rcadl'l' will Sl'l' how
much more rapidly scientific understanding can advanL'c ill a mullidisciplinal'V
field such as nutrition when adequate attention is paid to the scnsory alld leal'lll';1
aspects of behavior and their relationships to physiological processes in the gut.
liver and brain.
11. SOCIAL, SENSORY, AND SOMATIC FACTORS IN
APPETITE
Appetite, the disposition to eat and drink (Booth, 1976; Bolles, 1980) is subject to
a myriad of influences from the external and internal environments.
The tradition has been to divide these influences into two groups, On the onc
hand, it is supposed, there is the palatability of a foodstuff; other terms for this
include reward, pleasure ("hedonics"), craving, incentive, or even-confus-
ingly-appetite. On the other hand, the assumption goes, there are the somatic
factors facilitating ingestion and foods' postingestional inhibitory influences;
often, no less confusedly, these are labeled hunger or satiety, respectively.
This categorization remains highly influential. Yet the summation of fixed and
independent sensory and somatic influences fails to account for most of the facts
of ordinary eating.
A. Social Influences on Eating
For one thing, a theory considering only physiological signals and the sensory
characteristics of the diet ignores the sociology of food. Eating is subject to many
social and physical influences from the external environment, in addition to those
from foodstuffs themselves. A dinner bell or the clock moving toward a habitual
mealtime augments or even creates the desire to eat. The more enthusiastic the
eating around the table, the more someone in that company is liable to eat. These
are not peculiarly human attributes either. The rat, like Pavlov's dogs, can be
trained to eat when a bell rings (Valle, 1968; Weingarten, 1984). Galef (this
volume, Chapter 9) has provided many examples of social facilitation of eating in
rats.
The notion that satiety gates out palatability is not just incomplete. It is com-
prehensively refuted by the evidence for particular appetites and satieties, sum-
marized below. In other words, palatability is not stable but often highly con-
tingent on somatic and social context.
An appetite or a satiety is ingestive behavior under the control of both a
distinctive set of sensory characteristics and a contextual factor such as a particu-
lar bodily state. That is, the behavior is specific to a food and 100% under
"oro~l'II,~ory" L'onlrol. '1'cl. al thL',~anll' lime, it is specific to an internal state and
I()O'Y" l'onlrolled by signals of inL'ipient deficit or repletion.
The Illost familiar examples arc water-deficit-induced drinking within the
hroader phenomcnon of thirst, the appetite for water, and food-deprivation-
facil itated cating within the phenomenon of hunger, presumed to be the appetite
for cnergy. More clearly and conclusively analyzed examples, however, are the
innate hunger for sodium (Schulkin, this volume, Chapter 11) and carbohydrate-
conditioned satiety and hunger for arbitrary odors, tastes, and textures (Booth,
1972b; Booth and Davis, 1973). In such cases, it is logically impossible to
quantitate the sensory effect separately from quantitating the somatic effect and
then to add the two quantities to give the observed behavior. Rather, the behavior
is the result of presenting a unique combination of particular external and internal
stimuli.
No less a refutation of the traditional view is the way that the relative and
absolute attractiveness of a food often interact with social circumstance. For many
people, some conventional breakfast foods are not at all palatable except at the
first meal of the day (Birch et aI., 1984). Another example is the parent lucky
enough to have an adaptable palate and stomach, who is able to enjoy both eating
with the children and also the exotic fare at a banquet.
We proposed nearly 20 years ago a physiological and cognitive theory of appetite
(Booth, 1969, 1972a,b; Booth et al., 1972) that provided the basis for integrating
quantitative data on the psychobiological and psychosocial phenomena into a
psychobiosocial system of causal processes (Booth and Toates, 1974; Booth,
1978, 1988; Booth and Mather, 1978).
A. Framework for Appetite Neuroscience
This analytical and synthetic approach was intended to replace (Booth, 1967,
1968) the strategy hitherto used of merely invoking places in the brain to organize
appetite, such as dual centers in the hypothalamus. Instead, the neuroscience of
feeding could be built on integration of visceral, dietary, and wider environmental
inputs over multiple pathways through the brain to the skeletomotor control
systems (Booth, 1976, 1978). The specification also of visceral functions in
appetite could be used to analyze autonomic efferent-afferent loops and endo-
crine modulation of metabolism and gastrointestinal processing (Booth et al.,
1976b; Booth 1980a).
Neural pathways research is presented in Part V of this book. The quantitative
model and the qualitative theory have been highly successful in guiding our own
research both on learned controls of eating and also on some well-known neu-
robiological phenomena, such as obesity induced by ventromedial hypothalamic
lesions and its basis in rapid gastric elllptyillg (I )u)',)',allaud Ilootll. I IIX(I), visn'ml
and brain stem actions of appetite-suppressaul drugs alld lIol'llloncs (Il( lotll et 011"
1986a), noradrenergic gating of learned satiety (Boolh et al.. I()X(lh;(;ihson alld
Booth, 1989), and the macronutrient-specific appetites to be detailed here (Bakl'l
et aI., 1987; Gibson and Booth, 1988). Such behavioral and physiological ev i
dence on brain input-output relationships has not usually been allowed for hy
those tracing sensory and autonomic pathways, and so such work has not been as
productive as it might have been.
B. Regulation and Function in Appetite
This attention to the causal processes in appetite exposed the fallacy in dividing
ingestion or the influences on it into regulatory and nonregulatory categories
(Booth et aI., 1976b). Some influences on intake arise directly or indirectly from
deficits or supplies of water, energy, or other nutrients and so are capable of
contributing to the immediate regulation of those nutrient balances. Other influ-
ences might have an immediate dysregulatory impact in certain circumstances.
Yet such influences may have had life-preserving or reproduction-promoting
functions in our ancestors' ecology. The measurement of regulatory responses to
disturbances is uninformative unless the mechanisms by which the organism
responds to the challenge are examined.
Predation risk and the work cost of foraging must operate on the food intake
pattern through cuing mechanisms, just as depletion and repletion must do. If cues
from one rat's sickness do not condition aversion in another rat to cues from
dietary residues on the first rat, then we need to specify in what other way that
exchange of information may occur. Functional analysis is not a rival to mecha-
nistic analysis. The alternative to mechanism is magic.
The cognitive theory was that all appetite in familiar situations is a learned
reaction to combinations of cues (Booth, 1972b; Booth et aI., 1972). It follows
that sufficiently salient and recurrent conjunctions of features of the diet, the
body, and the culture could become incorporated in a conscious and linguistic
superstructure in human appetite (Booth, 1987a). This integrative learning begins
from the earliest acquaintances with foods and drinks (Booth et aI., 1974; Harris
and Booth, 1987) and continues throughout adulthood (Booth, 1972a; Booth et
al., 1986b). Therefore, moderate differences in sensitivity between people or with
aging, for example, are unlikely to account for differences in food preferences,
satiability, or cultural practices.
It is part of appetite if the sensed characteristics of materials affect any essential
component of the approach to and ingestion of materials or their rejection or
("',csliOIl, Sudl aspcl'ls 01 appl'llll' :Ill' variously kllown as sensory preferences and
avl'lsions (rclal ivc or ahsolull'). (IIn)palatahility. or food hedonics, reward, incen-
tive. dc, /\ diet's Sl.nsory illllul'nce on ingestion is sometimes talked about as a
qualitative elTed (e.g,. a preference for sweetness or crispness). Obviously,
though. the stimulus level is crucial.
Dietary stimuli influence ingestion with various degrees of sophistication. One
dimension of behavioral sophistication is the specificity and complexity of the
dietary stimuli controlling appetite. Another dimension is the degree to which the
dietary control of appetite is tied to context. Both forms of complexity in appetite
follow directly from learning. Habituated stimuli, classically conditioned cues,
and chunks of verbal information are all highly specific and often multidimen-
sional and contextualized. Nevertheless, there are a few examples of innately
organized sensory control of ingestive behavior.
Some dietary stimuli affect the organism's disposition to ingest, regardless of
bodily state or social context. These preferences or aversions are usually indepen-
dent of experience.
In the case of the congenital ingestive response to sweetness or the gaping
reflex to bitterness, the vigor of the response is monotonically (or at any rate
asymptotically) related to the strength of the taste. This is presumably because the
function of such innate responses is more important when the stimulus is more
concentrated.
It may prove relevant to protein preference to note that, contrary to the almost
universal assumption, sweetness cannot mean calories. The hungry primate needs
no encouragement to eat fruit that has become softer and less acid. Rather, we
have suggested, the sweet preference is a protein-peptide-amino acid preference
(Booth et aI., 1987). Receptors sensitive to the hydroxyl groups in amino acids,
connected to an ingestive reflex, would prevent novel dietary sources of protein
from being spat out by countering stimulation by amino acids of the aversion to
organic nitrogen groups, which is necessary to avoid plant toxins. It is absolutely
vital to protect neonatal suckling from disruption by the nitrogen aversion (bitter-
ness). On this theory, there would be no selection pressure on a protein-preference
receptor to detect sugars. So, receptors for aliphatic hydroxyls in omnivorous
mammals would have the side effect of a sugar preference for the plant kingdom to
exploit.
Learned responses are quite different. They do not increase indefinitely with
increases in stimulus strength. Any habituated or conditioned stimulus is highly
specific: the learned response is weaker when the test stimulus is weaker or
stronger thanlhe traincd stinnillls. Inlkl'd. Ill\' 1111111' dilkll'nllll\' stillnilll,', kwll:,
from the learned level, the greater is Ihis "",I'lwmlllillloll d''l"Il'llll'IIL''
1. Food Sweetness Preferences
This two-sided gradient in learned responses applies l'Vl'n 10 sWlTllaslL's, IIIwh,,1
was the first demonstration of caloric ally conditioncd rood prderences (Boolh l'I
aI., 1972), postingestional effects of carbohydrate preparations that did nol h;1V<'
aversive osmotic effects were shown to condition increased selection and intak,' (.1
a particular level of a taste (refuting the assumption that only aversions could 1)('
strongly conditioned to tastes).
The taste was sweetness, furthermore, at any level of a sugar or saccharin
Thus, the innate preference for stronger sweetness could be reversed by learninl'
that a lower sweetness was associated with greater caloric effects. In that case, not
only a weaker sweetness but also a sweetness stronger than the conditioned lewl
was less liked.
Similarly, adult human preference for the sweetness of a familiar food or drink
shows a peak at a particular level. That is, there is a stimulus generalization
decrement around the most preferred level of sweetness. This ideal point varies
among foods and among people, presumably as a result of past experiencl'
(Conner et aI., 1988a). Indeed, there are two sorts of "sweet tooth," which can
only have been induced by differences in eating habits. Sweetness preferences 1'01
snack foods and drinks and desserts tend to intercorrelate, while sweetness
preferences for vegetables and fruit tend to group together separately (Conner and
Booth, 1988; Conner et aI., 1988a), As argued below, the "snacking swecl
tooth" is a more plausible concept than "carbohydrate craving."
2. Multidimensional Preferences ~~ .
When the psychophysical function fot/sensory ~stituent is measured withoul
biasing performance, the asymmetrical inverted U of the traditional hedonic curve
is not obtained. The true preference peak is an isosceles triangle, with equal and
opposite slopes on either side of the peak. This applies to saltiness (Booth et al. ,
1983; Conner et aI., 1988b) as well as to sweetness, and to every other salient
attribute that has been tested so far.
A further major principle is that ingestive responses can become attached to
combinations of food attributes, within the taste modality or other modalities and
between sensory modalities (Booth, 1987d; Booth and Blair, 1988). The most
preferred hot drink may have a set of particular levels of volume, temperature,
brown color and bitterness, sweetness, thickness, and oiliness (coffee with sugar
and cream).
This complexity in the stimulus is, however, partly a matter of level of
analysis: a perceptually unitary smell may be comprised of many volatile com-
pounds; a combination of olfactory, gustatory, textural, and color information
may make up the full flavor of a fruit; a one-termed multidimensional formula
could describe a person's ideal cup of coffee (Booth, 1987d).
I1 is no greal cOllccplllal StL'p from the learned preferences and aversions for
IInique cOlllbinations of features of foods to the learned appetites and satieties, that
is, the control of ingestion by combinations that include features of bodily state or
of other contexts. If such context does not predict a particular nutritional effect,
[hen the resulting appetite or satiety is not nutrient specific, even though a
particular nutrient might have conditioned it.
1. Conditioned Desatiation
The first demonstrated internal-state-dependent sensory preference or aversion
was carbohydrate-conditioned desatiation (Booth, 1972b; Booth and Davis,
1973). This learned loss of satiation was also the caloric conditioning of flavor
preference first shown with sweet tastes by Booth et al. (1972), but the acquired
control of ingestion was demonstrated to be more refined than just by the sensory
attributes of the diet. The preference for the richer flavor was confined to choices
made early in the meal or while mildly hungry (Booth and Davis, 1973), as has
subsequently been confirmed many times in rats (Booth, 1977, 198Gb; Van Vort
and Smith, 1988; Gibson and Booth, 1989) and people (Booth et aI., 1976a, 1982;
Booth and Toase, 1983).
Thus, a dramatic increase in meal size (Booth, 1972b) was caused by a
conditioning of preference to the low-carbohydrate flavor specifically at the end
of the meal. That is, internal repletion cues had gained control of ingestion as well
as the dietary cues.
Gibson and Booth (1989) have shown that distension of the gastrointestinal
tract is sufficient to serve as the internal contextual cue for carbohydrate-
conditioned preference; nothing chemically specific is required. This fits the
universal assumption that gastric distension is a satiety signal. More importantly,
it supports a suggestion that has not been taken seriously enough even by the
advocates of gastric satiety, that the satiating effect of normal moderate distension
is entirely learned. The evidence is that gastric satiety gains chemical specificity
by being food specific, hence also that the sensory control of satiation is very
strong.
Even though distension can suffice as an internal cue for a carbohydrate-
conditioned preference, the flavor liking might also be contextualized to carbohy-
drate need and thus become a learned carbohydrate-specific appetite. We have
preliminary evidence that this can happen.
2. Conditioned Satiety and Noradrenergic Feeding
None of the foregoing data show the conditioning of satiety in an absolute sense.
That would be the acquisition of a genuine aversion in the replete state (Booth,
1972a, 198Gb). A large dose of sufficiently concentrated maltodextrin has re-
cently been demonstrated to do this (Booth et aI., 1986b).
It remains to be shown whether this learned food-specific satiety depends on a
carbohydrall'excess. 1I0wever, Leibowil/.l·l:d (/lIK'1) dailllthat the rat prekrs
to cat a familiar dictthal is rich spccifically illl'arbuhydrall' whl'lI a mcal is e1il'itcd
by injcction of norepincphrinc ncar thc parawntril'lliar 1I11dCllS.Such an injcction
specifically disrupts conditioned satiation (Mallhews ct a!., I<)X5;Booth et aI.,
1986b). Thus, it would be worth ascertaining whethcr carbohydrate-conditioned
satiety can be dependent on glucoreceptors in the intestine wall or parenterally.
On present evidence, this is the only mechanism that would make scientific sense
of the idea that norepinephrine elicits eating by inhibiting a carbohydrate-selective
satiety, releasing a relative appetite for carbohydrate.
sUlls 01 protein in lIalllral 11I;IIl'rials. Bacterial dccomposition could producc
slrong odors lroml'crtain ;ullillO acids, such as isobutyric acid from the branched-
,'h:lill amino acids and trimethylamine from others (Amoore, 1975).
Prompt prel'crences for some proteins in protein-deprived rats have been
interpreted as evidence for an innate protein appetite (Heinrichs et aI., 1988).
(fcncralization from protein in chow was not excluded, however. Furthermore,
just as with glucose from starch (Pilcher et aI., 1974), within a minute of ingestion
of protein, amino acids will begin to be released to duodenal receptors and
absorption, and so such data do not exclude postingestional reinforcement.
D. Nutrient-Specific Sensory Preferences
For the case of carbohydrate, this brings us to the issue of whether there are any
nutrient -specific appetites, as so often is claimed. The criterion of nutrient speci-
ficity, whether learned or innate, must be a facilitation of ingestion that comes
both from a sensory predictor of supply of the nutrient, independently of its form
in a particular diet, and also at the same moment from a somatic predictor of a
deficit of the same particular nutrient.
1. Craving for Carbohydrate or for Conventional Snack Foods?
As just explained, this crucial evidence for a carbohydrate-specific appetite has
yet to be established in the rat (or other animals). Notwithstanding much talk
about "carbohydrate cravings," such an appetite has yet to be found in human
subjects.
The existence of people wanting or eating foods that happen to be high in
carbohydrate (or fat) is no evidence whatsoever for selection of carbohydrate (or
fat). Nor is preference for high-protein foods evidence of protein selection. Our
culture provides low- and high-protein foods and drinks for use in different
circumstances and attaches different attributions to them. For technological rea-
sons (low water activity and so good storage), convenience foods are high in
lipids, sugar, salt, and/or dried starch. They are thought of as foods to eat away
from meals and also as nutritionally poor. Choice of such foods must therefore be
assumed, until proved otherwise, to be merely a craving for conventional snack
foods or even for supposedly "junk" food, as opposed to behavior under the
control of any specific nutrient's action in the body.
In the case of' 'protein craving," there has recently been some progress toward
identifying nutrient specificity.
B. Learned Protein Appetite
Any particular source of good-quality protein would have manifold sensory
characteristics, and indeed, for human beings at least, a conceptual character such
as "meat" or "beans." Each major protein source could thus become preferred as
a result of postingestional reinforcement-for example, from relief of limiting
levels of an essential amino acid in the detector site in prepyriform cortex (Leung
and Rogers, 1971; Booth and Stribling, 1978; Gibson et aI., 1987).
Furthermore, the reinforcing action of the essential amino acids could itself
serve to identify an internal cue to the specific depletion that is being repaired.
This need signal could be configured with the cues distinguishing the dietary
protein source. Then the protein-conditioned sensory preference would be depen-
dent also on the presence of a need state. Just such a protein-specific appetite is
learned in one or two experiences by mildly deprived rats, using either odor cues
(Gibson and Booth, 1986; Baker et aI., 1987) or textural cues (Booth and Baker,
1988).
Rats with trigeminal lesions lose the ability to avoid insufficient intake of
protein when given the usual laboratory choice between high casein and high
dextrin diets (Miller and Teates, 1985). Thus, some textural characteristics of the
casein are learned, to cue the effects of protein. Drugs that act on the brain stem
pattern generators for ingestion, as both serotoninergic and dopaminergic agents
do, will modify the effects of texture on ingestion regardless of the textural cue's
learned nutritional significance. Thus the basis for supposing that the serotonin is
involved in selection of carbohydrate over protein has proved to be confounded
(Booth and Baker, 1988; Gibson and Booth, 1988). Some other explanation must
therefore also be considered for the reported suppression of intake of high-
carbohydrate foods after and between meals by serotonergic drugs in human
subjects (Wurtman et aI., 1981; Wurtman and Wurtman, 1986).
In fact, neither fenfluramine nor amphetamine in doses that suppress intake has
been found to alter the preference for a sensory cue to either protein or carbohy-
...drate in rats (Gibson and Booth, 1988). This is true even though the protein-need
state on which the protein-conditioned preference depends involves a halving of
brain levels of amino acid precursors for both serotonin and the catecholamines
(Gibson et aI., 1987).
v. MECHANISMS OF PROTEIN-SPECIFIC APPETITE
A. Innate Protein Appetite
There is no firm evidence for an innate protein appetite. It is difficult to specify a
sensory cue that would reliably indicate the presence, amount, or quality of all the
Thcrc is tllll.s1)(1n'asoll to illvokc thl' snotolllll 01 1I0ll'pllll'pluIIIl' "thl'OIIl'S" pi
lIutricllt sl'icl'lioll ir pcopil"s rood pn'ktrllccs ;111'Chilll)',l'dhy dnll'.S or dll'lolIY
preloads towilrd or away rrolll prolcill·rich roods. TIll' lirst 11I1'l'h;lIlisIlIS10 COil
sidcr arc cithcr scnsory illlcracliolls (c.g., roodspceiril" hahituatioll rrolll till'
prcload) or cognitivc mcchanisms (c.g., awarcncss that all appelile,sllppll'ssallt
dru.g is limiting i~tak.e and .a rcsulting rocus or cating choiccs, lhcrcr;;lt~~r
delIberate focus of eatIng on foods supposed to be nutritious, which arc liable ill
fact to be higher in protein content).
VI. THE RESEARCH NEED: APPETITE MECHANISMS, NOT
INTAKE EFFECTS
These results should make it very clear that substantial advances in our under-
standing of appetite depend on investigations that assess specific mental, phys-
iological, and social processes. This cannot be achieved by the usual procedures
of measuring food intake or collecting ratings of appetite without also unconfoun-
dedly controlling or independently measuring the influences on such intakes or
verbal data. Such unanalytical research at best raises questions; at worst, it
obfuscates the scientific issues and fails to help or even harms the general public.
Fundamental discovery and applicable conclusions depend on identifying and
measuring the causal processes operative in the individual. Causation can be
identified only by double dissociation. The strength of each causal process can be
measured only as the sensitivity of its physicopsychometric (dose-response)
function. These elementary and scientifically universal methodological require-
ments still apply if the risk must be taken of assuming that everybody operates in
qualitatively identical causal networks.
The particular appetite mechanism of protein- or carbohydrate-specific dietary
selection is demonstrated to exist insofar as approach behavior and ingestion are
shown to be activated by cues only to foods' contents of the nutrient in question,
rather than activated by other features of the foods. No such demonstration has
been forthcoming for the basic phenomenon called "carbohydrate craving," let
alone its dependence on serotoninergic transmission.
All the analytical evidence is that the differences in dietary selection that have
been observed in rats and people after pharmacological or dietary manipulations
are not nutritionally controlled behavior, mediated specifically by any mono-
amine neurotransmitter. In people, what obviously could be happening is that
perceptions of the experimental manipulations are interacting with snacking hab-
its and other food choices, to accord with cultural stereotypes of healthy eating
and weight control practices (Blair et al., 1989).
These and other causal hypotheses must be tested before any interpretation can
responsibly be laid before the public, let alone claims made that effective means to
reduce obesity or emotional distress have been identified. The alleged craving for
carbohydrate rather than protein is not only a clear case of unrecognized interac-
tions between neuroscience and sociology, and at more than one level. It is also a
11I:lIll1'l xalllpll' 01 t1l1rals to IIl':lIlh arisillg IlIorc widely rrom thc IIcglect or
khavioral seil'lIl'(' wilhill Ilutrit)(111(l\ooth, IlJXlJc).
What IIccds addrcssillg is the cOllvcntional practice of consuming energy-
cOlltaining drillk and rood itcllls betwecn and after meals. Social psychology and
rood tcchnology should havc rar more to say about that than biochemical nutrition
or ncuroscience.
Beauchamp: I have one question. You made an analogy, if I understood you
right, between salt and protein hunger. Salt hunger has an innate sensory compo-
nent to it. Do you sec any innate sensory component to protein hunger-for
example, amino acid flavors or something of that sort?
Booth: The analogy I drew was a mechanistic one saying that the hunger in this
sense has to have both the sensory information and a bodily source of information.
The innate sodium appetite is, I believe, a reduction in the aversiveness of strong
salt taste, which by inheritance is peculiar to salt deficiency in the body. Taking
that as a structure, whether it's right or wrong, the analogy I'm drawing is that as a
result of learning, then one goes to whatever flavor signals a protein supply in the
diet, when and only when the body is telling onc that one needs protein. So the
analogy is between the dual source of information that is controlling the behavior.
The difference, the important difference as I sce it, is that one is programmed by
the genes, the other is programmed by personal experience.
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Part III Discussion
Friedman: I have a question for leff Oalef. You describe very elegantly how
pairing of the social experience with the flavors can create these preferences and
can even overcome learned taste aversions. Have you or anyone looked at the
opposite situation, namely, when an animal communicates to another animal that
food is safe, but communicates inaccurately? Would one animal form an aversion
to another animal that lied to him?
Galef: The answer is that neither I nor anyone else has done that particular
experiment. There is some work now on deceit, and Marler's group is looking at
the question of deceitful communications with respect to feeding. I don't know
whether they've looked to see whether an individual learns an aversion to deceit-
ful others. My feeling is you could probably teach an animal such a thing. We've
done experiments in which one rat serves as a signal to another as to where to go to
look for food, and it's our experience that over trials, if the informant is a liar, cer-
tainly the recipient of the information learns to ignore that information. Whether
or not it's particular to individuals though, I couldn't tell you.
Spector: I have a question for Michael Tordoff. In the experiment where you
were pairing one flavor with fructose and the other flavor with glucose, the logic
"was that since the brain can't use fructose, you might expect a differential
preference. And in fact, you found that the rats preferred flavors paired with
fructose over glucose. Wouldn't you expect the same findings in the experiment
where you were infusing glucose'! 11 SlTllIl'd Ilkl' they didll't shllw a prl'll'n'lH'l'
one way or the other.
Tordoff: I think that the question is not what the brain can use, but whal thl'
liver can use, When you give a load offructose, morc of that is going to be used by
the liver than is an equivalent load of glucose. The same may be truc for fa!. Thl'
fat is not going to be used very well at all by the brain, and neither is thc fruetosc,
It's the one that the liver is using and not what the brain is using.
Cabanac: Also a question to the same speaker. How do your results relate with
Russek's hypothesis putting the main input for satiety in the liver?
TordotT: Well I think Russek is very happy with my results because one of the
things that they show is that the infusions he's using may not be causing a taste
aversion. The way that we did the infusions, we get a taste preference. I don't sec
any problems with Russek's theory except that he says that the signal originates
from lactate or pyruvate. I would disagree with the precise nature of the signal, but
not with the general ideas of what Russek is saying.
Blundell: This is a question for Mike Tordoff about the model that included the
effects of sweetness on fuel storage and oxidation. Most of the experiments, if not
all those you did, use saccharin as the sweet stimulus. But, as you've shown
with the hepatic vagotomy data, and as Michael Naim showed yesterday with
cyclic AMP, and as there is data in the literature showing that saccharin blocks
glucose-6-phosphatase, saccharin is having quite a profound metabolic effect.
The question is whether the effects of sweeteners that you indicated were pertinent
in the model are really saccharin-specific. Can you disassociate the sweetness
effect per se from the metabolic consequences of saccharin ingestion, which
appear to be fairly profound?
TordotT: I think that it's the metabolic consequences of sweetness that are
important, not the saccharin itself. We don't think that it's the pharmacological
effects of saccharin that are important in this particular model because Dani Reed
and I have shown, for example, that a rat that sham feeds sucrose will increase its
food intake.
Blundell: Well you've done the experiment to disengage sweetness per se from
its metabolic consequences.
Booth: As far as Galef's evidence goes, the social reinforcer of the information
that the demonstrator is providing is, so to speak, "good breath"; they are all
particular odorants in the animal's breath. In that sense, you have a molecule, or a
few molecules, that actually mediate this social information. Do you have evi-
dellce or reasoll III tliillk llial tl\('n' 1IIl' 1IIIIChIII000ecomplicated IIlCcliallisms
adllally illducing tlie k,lIl1illl"!
GaleI': I'm simply going to speculate because I really have no evidence. I would
be very surprised iI'the carbon disulfide is in some sense a reinforcer. I suspect it's
more of a signal for a much more complex series of events that gets foods that are
experienced in contiguity with that signal treated in a very different way from
foods that are simply experienced without that signal. I guess I would agree with
the latter rather than the former model that you proposed.
